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My comments this afternoon are responsive to John Garvey’s Presidential 
Address on Institutional Pluralism at last year’s meeting. The gist of his 
address, delivered gracefully, undogmatically, and persuasively, is that it may 
be desirable to have law schools that are devoted substantially to particular 
endeavors and points of view. Dean Garvey mentioned law schools that 
concentrate on teaching particular subjects, such as law and economics, or 
training for geographical areas, such as northern New York, or preparing 
for forms of practice, such as clinical work, or helping a particular group of 
potential lawyers, such as African‑Americans, or reflecting a special point 
of view about a person’s place in the world and its relation to law and legal 
practice, such as law schools with a substantial religious perspective.
I should like to draw attention to what is a nuance of difference, if not an 
outright distinction, between this last group of law schools and the others, 
one that both affects how we as members of the AALS should view arguments 
in their favor but also heightens the possible tension between a school’s 
aspirations and the liberty of individual faculty members.
Dean Garvey treats the topic in terms of a balance of advantages, what 
diversity among law schools can contribute to the entire law school community 
and legal profession. No one doubts that law students as a group should be 
exposed to diverse perspectives and opportunities. Crudely stated, the issue 
is whether it is best to count on diversity within each of the schools, and in 
the communities and culture outside of law schools, or to encourage diversity 
fostered by individual law schools taking special directions. One might 
think, although Garvey does not, that given diversity in the broad culture, 
in undergraduate education, and within law schools of any substantial size, 
we have no need for schools setting out on their own focused missions, that 
is, focused on something other than providing the best possible broad legal 
education.
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The question Dean Garvey addresses is about overall good, analyzed 
without any presupposition about the truth of any particular religious or 
political viewpoint. But an organization like ours must also consider another 
perspective. What should be the response if individuals strongly believe 
they should undertake one form or another of special educational focus? 
An individual, or most members of an organization, might conclude that, 
on balance, some form of diverse education is actually undesirable, but that 
individuals should not be denied the opportunity to engage in that education 
if they feel strongly about it. The question would then arise what concessions 
from ordinary standards, if any, should be made so that those who wish can 
further such education.
I want to be clear that by approaching the subject from this perspective, 
I do not mean to indicate skepticism about the value of schools with special 
missions. In my own work over the years, I have benefitted greatly from contacts 
with law schools in the Roman Catholic tradition. The reason I approach the 
topic from the perspective of conscience is probably a consequence of my 
longstanding interest in religious liberty.
If we focus on a law school that would concentrate heavily on clinical 
education, or law and economics, we probably would conclude that, if 
students are forewarned about the school’s emphasis and the school provides 
a sufficiently broad education so that students who discover that their interests 
or career opportunities lie elsewhere will have been adequately prepared, those 
who want to create such a school should be free to do so. It would follow that 
in initial hiring decisions, such schools should be able to give weight to interest 
in the subjects they wish to emphasize. What of tenured faculty already at 
the school, or faculty whose interests shift after they receive tenure? So long 
as these faculty members perform the teaching responsibilities to which they 
are assigned, I do not think they should lose their positions because they no 
longer are an ideal fit with the school’s overall aspirations.
When it comes to aiding particular groups of the population, the AALS 
should consider whether the aid counters pervasive discrimination or helps 
perpetuate it. It would, for example, appropriately refuse to sanction a law 
school devoted to assisting white students to the exclusion of law students of 
color.
Schools that wish to convey and embody a religious or other ideological 
message are special both because they touch especially strongly on basic 
issues of conscience and can generate decisions about hiring and firing that 
contravene what we take as basic standards for most purposes.
I shall pass over one conceivable argument in favor of schools devoted to 
particular religious perspectives, namely that most leading law schools are so 
dominantly secular, with faculty members who by and large have little interest 
in religion, that religious law schools are needed to redress the balance. It 
may be that religious perspectives of various sorts would get swallowed up if 
133
distributed evenly across law schools, but one could not reach that conclusion 
without some complicated empirical assumptions.
Many who wish to participate in a law school that concentrates on clinical 
education or opportunities for African Americans may feel that doing so is a 
matter of social conviction or conscience. In the same way, I believe that for 
those who wish to organize and to participate in law schools with a religious 
perspective, the endeavor is likely to be a matter of conscience or conviction. 
Law school education is one forum for communicating religious values 
they deeply believe in. For the rest of us, not feeling drawn to participate in 
such an endeavor, the question is not only what is desirable overall, or even 
whether to yield to a reasonable individual choice about what to do, but also 
whether to make an accommodation to conscience. We might think of the 
option of a genuinely religious law school as not unlike the kind of issue of 
accommodation that arises under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. I 
am not sure how many of the creators and faculty of religious law schools 
consider their involvement to be a matter of religious conscience, or at least 
strong conviction, but the number is not small.
If one conceives of both universities and religious institutions as “separate 
spheres” each of which should be granted considerable autonomy by the 
state, an analogous question arises at the institutional level: how far should a 
body representing the broad principles of justice for law schools, such as the 
Association of American Law Schools, seek to accommodate the autonomy 
of individual law schools conceived as both religious and devoted to legal 
education? If we view this particular claim of diversity from the vantage 
point of accommodation, the claim in its favor seems particularly strong, 
independent of one’s evaluation of the net benefit to the legal community of 
having law schools with this special focus.
But with this strength comes a cost that does not exist for law schools that 
illustrate other forms of diversity. To create such a school requires selecting 
faculty members on the basis of their religious affiliation or at least their 
sympathy with the chosen religious endeavor. Yet selection for employment 
that discriminates by religion violates one of our fundamental norms of 
equality.1
How serious a concern is this? Were there so many religious law schools of 
a particular type that job opportunities were extremely scarce for nonbelievers 
or members of different faiths, the concern would be very great. By contrast, 
were there outright, though unacknowledged, discrimination against seriously 
religious individuals at most law schools, occasional selectivity in favor of 
believers might redress an imbalance. I think the truth lies somewhere between 
these ends of the spectrum. I am unaware of any pervasive disadvantage in 
the teaching market for religious believers, although I think that outspoken 
defense of certain positions that are highly unpopular among most law school 
1. See Bylaws of the Association of American Law Schools, Inc. § 6‑3 (2008), available at http://
www.aals.org/about_handbook_bylaws.php.
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faculty and are commonly based on religious premises may well be a handicap. 
Relatively few law schools are strongly religious in the sense of wanting a 
particular affiliation or commitment from their faculty members. If those law 
schools do freely select on the grounds they like, that does not significantly 
affect (if it affects at all) overall job opportunities in law teaching. Such selection 
undoubtedly influences the distribution of opportunities. A non‑Mormon has 
less opportunity to teach at Brigham Young than he or she would if Brigham 
Young were indifferent to religious affiliation. But the opportunity to teach at 
another law school may be marginally enhanced because an able Mormon has 
been drawn to Brigham Young.
I am not sure whether anyone has made a careful study of how many law 
schools do use religious criteria to choose faculty members and what the likely 
effect is on job opportunities overall, but such a study might influence how 
one views this issue.
Religious criteria may influence faculty at three career stages: initial hiring, 
the grant of tenure, and decisions about employment once tenure is granted. 
My present inclination about religion and faculty employment is toward these 
positions. Seriously religious law schools should be able to consider not only 
sympathy with their religious endeavor but also actual religious convictions 
and affiliations in initial hiring, and it should be possible for them to acquire 
the information necessary to make such choices.2 To obtain this privilege, 
perhaps a school should have to present to the AALS a statement outlining its 
sense of mission and why it needs particular information to fulfill that mission. 
Thus, if it were enough for a Roman Catholic school that an applicant be 
sympathetic to its mission, whether or not a Roman Catholic, the school might 
not be allowed to inquire about actual denominational membership.
At the tenure stage, I think a school should be able to judge a faculty 
member’s fit with its mission, based on his or her teaching and scholarship. 
Probably at this point the school should have to rely on what the teacher has 
actually done, without further inquiry into personal beliefs, attitudes, and 
affiliations.
Once a faculty member is awarded tenure, my sense is that the balance 
should shift. If he or she is teaching competently and doing the (minimal) 
amount of scholarship that may be required, the school should then take the 
risk about fit with mission. That is, those in authority should not be able to 
terminate a professor’s employment based on a determination that he has 
drifted too far from the ideals of the school. Perhaps, however, a school that 
sets highly specific standards of behavior or affiliation and makes these a clear 
condition of continued employment should be able to dismiss a professor 
who definitely violates such standards. With this possible exception, I think 
2. But see Association of American Law Schools, Inc., Executive Committee Regulations § 
6‑3.1 (2005), available at http://www.aals.org/about_handbook_regulations/php (allowing 
law schools with “religious affiliation or purpose to adopt preferential admissions and 
employment practices that directly relate to the school’s religious affiliation or purpose”).
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judgments about faculty members based on fit with religious aspirations should 
end with the award of tenure. Part of my reason is that a school with a strong 
religious outlook should be able to cope with a limited number of faculty who 
may have drifted toward heretical beliefs and attitudes after acquiring tenure.
At present, my sense is not only that the schools should adopt the attitude 
I’ve suggested, but that the AALS should insist on it, with the sanctions that 
Article 7 of the Bylaws provides standing in the wings. This may be the present 
understanding. Section 4.3 of the Executive Regulations adopts the following 
Interpretive Comments issued in 1970 in regard to the American Association 
of University Professors’ 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure: 
“Most church‑related institutions no longer need or desire the departure from 
the principles of academic freedom implied in the 1940 Statement, and we 
do not now endorse such a departure.”3 Firing a tenured professor because 
of a change in his or her religious views would be a departure. If “we do not 
endorse” also includes “we do not accept,” dismissal would be a violation of 
the Association’s standard of academic freedom.
In conclusion, apart from their value overall, the presence of law schools 
with a strong religious mission presents a significant issue of accommodation 
to religious conscience and a complicated question of the consequences for 
permissible standards of faculty employment.
3. Id. at § 4.3 (quoting American Association of University Professors, Policy Documents and 
Reports, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure 3 (AAUP Press, 
Washington, D.C., 10th ed., 2006)).
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